State v. Morgan Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40775 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-11-2013
State v. Morgan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40775
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Morgan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40775" (2013). Not Reported. 1309.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1309
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAM1---~----
STATE OF IDAHO, ) COPY 
) Nos.40775,40776 ____ _ 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Bonneville Co. Case Nos. 
vs. ) CR-2008-16524, CR-2009-22169 
) 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JOHN C. McKINNEY 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
: e~r::z:' -~~:~--, 
". « '• -,-..,.·~---




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
E ...................................................... 1 
Nature 
Statement of 
Case ............................................................... 1 
and Course Proceedings .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . ........... 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT.. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. ................................................ 5 
I. If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals, 
That Court Lacks The Authority To Review The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Morgan's Motion 
Augment The Record; Alternatively, Morgan Has Failed 
To Show Any Constitutional Violation Resulting From The 
Denial Of His Motion To Augment .......................................... 5 
Introduction .................................................................. 5 
B. Standard Of Review ........................................................ 5 
C. The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be 
Assigned This Case, Lacks The Authority To 
Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision ............... 6 
D. Even If The Merits Of Morgan's Argument Are 
Reviewed On Appeal, Morgan Has Failed To 
Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights ...................................................... 7 
II. Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion In Not Further Reducing 
His Sentence In His First Case, And By Not Sua Sponte 
Reducing His Sentence In His Second Case ........................... 11 
A. Introduction ................................................................... 11 
B. Standard Of Review ..................................................... 12 
C. Morgan Has Failed To Establish The District 
Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion ....................... 12 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 16 
C SERVICE ............................................................... 16 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Downing v. State, 1) ................................... 9 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S 1 1) ............................................... 8 
State v. Adams, 115 1053 (Ct. 1 .. . .. . .. .. .. .. . .. . . .. .. . . .. . .. .. ... . .. ... 9 
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 834 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1992) ....................... 12 
State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 79 P.3d 734 (Ct. App. 2003) ........................ 6 
State v. Brunet, 2013 WL 6001894 (2013) ............................................. passim 
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) ................................................ 9 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App. 2009).. .. ........... 1 13 
State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 783 P .2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989) ......................... 12 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998) .................................... 12 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,288 P.3d 835 (Ct. App. 2012) ........................... 6 
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 244 P.3d 145 (2010) .............................................. 9 
State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900 (1983) ................................................................... 9 
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 23 P.3d 786 (Ct. App. 2001) ............................. 6 
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005) ....................................... 12 
State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) ................................................................ 9 
State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994) .................................... 12 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582, P.2d 728 (1978) ........................................... 12 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
consolidated appeals the d court's 
order revoking probation and executing his sentence without further reduction in 
Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, and from the district court's order 
revoking his probation and executing his sentence without any reduction in Idaho 
Supreme Court Case No. 40776, Morgan also challenges the Idaho Supreme 
Court's order denying his motion to augment the record to include transcripts 
from various proceedings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, Morgan was charged with three 
counts of delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.18-19.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Morgan pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of 
a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and an amended count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.23-24, 36-
40.) The district court sentenced Morgan to seven years with two and one-half 
years fixed for the delivery charge, and five years with two years fixed 
(concurrent) for the possession charge, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.50-53.) 
After he completed his rider, the court suspended execution of Morgan's 
sentence and placed him on probation subject to conditions. (R., pp.56-61.) 
Several months later, Morgan's probation officer filed a Report of 
Probation Violation. (R., pp.62-63.) The report alleged four violations, including 
failing to complete a substance abuse evaluation or engage in treatment, being 
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unsuccessfully discharged from an aftercare program for lack of attendance, 
admitting in writing to using methamphetamine twice in October 2009, and failing 
to report in person to 15 out of 19 scheduled appointments with his probation 
officer. (Id.) Prior to the admit/deny hearing on the probation violation 
allegations in his first case, Morgan was again charged with possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), which allegedly occurred in December 
2009 (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40776). (R., pp.155-156.) 
During a joint hearing on both cases, and pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Morgan admitted the probation violations in his first case, and pleaded guilty to 
possessing methamphetamine in the second case. (R., pp.67-71, 177-182.) In 
the probation violation disposition on the first case, the district court continued 
Morgan on probation with additional conditions. (R., pp.73-76.) In the second 
case, the district court sentenced Morgan to seven years with three years fixed, 
all suspended, and placed him on probation for seven years. (R., pp.187-190.) 
In July 2010, Morgan was found to have violated his probations by being 
discharged from an in-patient drug treatment program for continued rule 
violations, and was ordered to complete a second rider. (R., pp.78-79, 88-96, 
203-204, 219-224.) After Morgan completed his second rider, the district court 
suspended his sentences and placed him on probation. (R., pp.97-99, 227-229.) 
In October 2012, Morgan admitted violating his probations by using 
methamphetamine (10/15/12 Tr., p.1, L.21 - p.22, L.7), and following an 
evidentiary hearing on the remaining allegations, the district court found he also 
violated his probations by failing to notify his probation officer of a change in 
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employment, failing to participate in a drug treatment program, and 
(10/29/12 , p.20, - p.22, L The district court 
judgments on the violations, revoked Morgan's probations and 
executed his sentences in both cases. (R., pp.122-125, 255-258.) Morgan filed 
a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences in both cases (R., pp.126-127, 
259-260), and at the end of a hearing on the motion, the district court stated it 
would review the files and issue an opinion (R., pp.128, 263; 2/19/13 Tr., p.25, 
Ls.12-16). However, instead issuing an opinion specifically addressing 
Morgan's Rule 35 motions, the district court entered an Amended Judgment and 
Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation in each case, reflecting the 
original underlying sentences. 1 (R., pp.129-132, 264-267.) Morgan timely 
appealed both cases, which have been consolidated on appeal. (R., pp.133-135, 
268-270; 4/4/13 "Order Consolidating Appeals".) 
1 The only discernible difference between each case's Judgment of Commitment 
on Conviction of a Probation Violation (R., pp.122-125, 255-258) and their 
"Amended" versions (R., pp.129-132, 264-267) appears to be that the latter 
judgments added a recommendation that Morgan participate rn the therapeutic 




Morgan states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Morgan due process 
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment 
with transcripts necessary for review of the issues on 
appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed, in the 
First Case to further reduce, and failed in the second Case 
to reduce, Mr. Morgan's sentences sua sponte upon 
revoking probation? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Assuming this Court addresses the issue, has Morgan failed to show any 
constitutional violation resulting from the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
motion to augment the record with transcripts that have not been prepared? 
2. Has Morgan failed to establish the that the district court abused its discretion 
in not further reducing his sentence in his first case, and by not sua sponte 




If This Case Is Assigned To The Idaho Court Of Appeals. That Court Lacks The 
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision To Deny Morgan's 
Motion To Augment The Record; Alternatively, Morgan Has Failed To Show Any 
Constitutional Violation Resulting From The Denial Of His Motion To Augment 
Introduction 
On appeal, Morgan requested transcripts from (1) his December 15, 2008 
change of plea hearing, (2) his March 2, 2009 sentencing hearing, (3) his 
January 4, 2010 change of plea hearing, (4) his February 1, 2010 disposition and 
sentencing hearing, (5) his July 13, 2010 admit/deny hearing, (6) his August 2, 
2010 disposition hearing, and (7) his January 28, 2013 disposition hearing. 
(6/4/13 Motion.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion as to all but the 
January 28, 2013 disposition hearing transcript. (6/19/13 Order.) In his brief on 
appeal, Morgan argues that the Court's denial of augmentation with the 
remaining transcripts violates his right to due process and equal protection. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-20.) Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, however, that Court lacks authority to review the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision to deny Morgan's motion. Further, even if the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of Morgan's motion is reviewed on appeal, Morgan has failed to 
establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
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facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct Apo. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P 3d 786, 794 (Ct App. 2001 ). 
C. The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case, Lacks The 
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, 
in effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior 
to assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the 
Supreme Court decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other 
law." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618,620,288 P.3d 835 (Ct App. 2012). "Such 
an undertaking," the Court explained, "would be tantamount to the Court of 
Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is 
plainly beyond the purview of this Court." Id. However, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals did leave open the possibility of review of such motions in some 
circumstances. 19.:. Such circumstances may occur, the Court indicated, where 
"the completed appellant's and/or respondent's briefs have refined, clarified, or 
expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for 
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support 
a renewed motion." ~ 
Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the 
authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's order. Morgan has failed to 
demonstrate the need for additional transcripts, and he has not presented any 
evidence to support a renewed motion to augment the record. The arguments 





Court in his motion - i.e., 
same 
a sentence requires consideration of such and that 
be violated without the transcripts. (Compare Motion 




Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review, and in 
effect, reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Morgan has 
failed to provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appellant's Brief that 
would permit the Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
must decline, if it is assigned this case, to review the Idaho Supreme Court's 
denial of Morgan's motion to augment the record. 
D. Even If The Merits Of Morgan's Argument Are Reviewed On Appeal, 
Morgan Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His 
Constitutional Rights 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Morgan's constitutional 
claims, all of his arguments fail. Morgan argues that he is entitled to the 
additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation 
of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the effective 
assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-20.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court recently rejected the same arguments in State v. Brunet, 2013 
WL 6001894 (2013). 2 
2 Morgan did not have the benefit of the Court's opinion in Brunet when he wrote 
his brief. 
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In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that 
transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of 
the appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet 
at *3 (citing Maver v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 )). "[C]olorable 
need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts exhibited." 
kl In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the requested 
transcripts contained specific information relevant to [the] appeal." Id. 
"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of . . . transcripts could prevent [the appellant] 
from determining whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there 
was factual information contained in the transcripts that might relate to his 
arguments" does not demonstrate a "colorable need." in other words, an 
appellant is not entitled to transcripts in order to "search the transcripts for a 
reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in the first place." kl Such an 
endeavor is a '"fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense" - an exercise the 
constitution does not endorse. In short, "[m]ere speculation or hope that 
something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific 
information necessary to establish a colorable need." kl 
Morgan argues the transcripts from his seven identified hearings are 
relevant, regardless of whether they have been prepared or not, because "a 
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal was filed" but rather, "the court is entitled to utilize 
knowledge gained from its own official position and observations," and "the 
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive 
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inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events which 
occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-1 In arguing that the requested transcripts are relevant, Morgan cites 
Idaho cases holding that a court is entitled to use knowledge learned from its 
official position and observations in imposing sentence. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-15.)3 Morgan asserts that, because the court can use information learned 
in prior proceedings when sentencing a defendant, transcripts of those 
proceedings are relevant. But the mere assertion that the transcripts are relevant 
does not make them so. Brunet, 2013 WL at *3 (see Appellant's Brief, pp.10-18). 
Ultimately, Morgan fails to provide a legal basis for his proposition, and only 
makes self-serving conclusory assertions. 
Although the appellate court's review of a sentence is independent, as 
noted in Brunet, the review is limited to the "entire record available to the trial 
court at sentencing." 2013 WL at *4 (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244 
P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). As in Brunet, the record in this case contains the relevant 
sentencing materials including the original presentence report ("PSI") prepared in 
January 2009, and the addendum to that report ("APSI"). It also includes three 
letters to the district court written by Morgan, a letter by a potential employer 
(Julie McKinney), a reference letter from a former employer ("Kleen Machine"), 
progress notes by Road to Recovery regarding Morgan's substance abuse 
treatment, and a psychological evaluation report. (State's Exhibit 1; Confidential 
3 Citing Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-7 4 (Ct. App. 2001 ); State v. Sivak, 
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-
56 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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Exhibits 1 through 7.) In addition, the court orders that issued as a result of each 
hearing are included in the record. (R., pp.20-21, 45-47, 67-68, 73-76, 88-89, 
90-91, 120-121.) "Therefore, the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *4. As such, 
Morgan "has failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or equal 
protection by this Court's refusal to order the creation of transcripts at taxpayer 
expense in order to augment the record on appeal." 1L 
Morgan further complains that "[t]o ignore the positive factors that were 
present at the previous hearings presents a negative, one-sided view of [him]" 
and deprives him "from addressing those positive factors in support of his 
appellate sentencing claims." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Morgan, however, fails to 
explain why that information cannot be derived from the available record or, if 
such factors existed, why they should not have been presented to the court at the 
final disposition hearing (assuming they were not presented, which is unlikely). 
Regardless, this argument is representative of the sort of fishing expedition the 
Court in Brunet said was improper. 
Morgan next argues that "effective counsel cannot be given in the 
absence of access to the relevant transcripts." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) This 
argument also fails. Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of 
the requested transcripts for incorporation into the record" results in the 
"prospective[]" denial of the effective assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet 
concluded Brunet "failed to demonstrate how his counsel's performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness without the requested 
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transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is 
contained within the record on appeal." Brunet at *5. The same is true in this 
case. "This record meets [Morgan's} right to a record sufficient to afford 
adequate and effective appellate review." lsl As such, Morgan has failed to 
show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the partial denial of his motion to 
augment. 
Because Morgan failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the 
transcripts he was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the 
denial of his motion to augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional 
rights, his claims fail. 
11. 
Morgan Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Not Further Reducing His Sentence In His First Case. And By Not Sua Sponte 
Reducing His Sentence In His Second Case 
A Introduction 
Morgan argues that the district court abused its discretion in not further 
reducing his sentence in his first case, 4 and by not sua sponte reducing his 
sentence in his second case. He specifically contends that his good employment 
history, his performance during his two riders, and newly discovered mental 
health issues (depressive and anxiety disorders) are mitigating factors 
demonstrating his sentences are excessively harsh. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-
4 The record shows that the district court did not reduce any of Morgan's original 
sentences when it revoked his probation and ordered the sentences imposed. 
(Cf. R., pp.50-53 with pp.129-132, and pp.196-199 with 264-267.) 
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23.) The record supports the district court's sentencing decisions; Morgan has 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Morgan Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original 
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing 
State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's 
decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject 
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant 
to "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 
140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) 
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) 
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing 
court "will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
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original judgment," i e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as as 
occurring between the original sentencing and revocation of 
probation. Hanington, 1 at 29, 218 3d at 8. 
At the time of his initial sentencing in his first case (No. 40775), Morgan 
had previously been convicted of three felonies in three separate cases (two 
forgeries and one possession of a controlled substance) and one misdemeanor, 
and had been charged with many more offenses that had been dismissed. (See 
1/8/09 PSI, pp.3-5.) The presentence investigator noted in preparation for 
sentencing that, despite Morgan's support from his fiance and her family, "given 
the defendant's history and prior record, it is doubtful whether this alone will be 
enough to stop the defendant from offending again." (Id., p.12.) The evaluator 
recommended a rider, explaining, "I don't believe that supervision in the 
community is appropriate at this time, as Mr. Morgan has had numerous felony 
charges (including one for battery) and has not been successful on probation in 
the past" (Id.) 
The district court granted Morgan a rider and placed him on probation 
after he successfully completed the rider program. (R., pp.50-53, 56-61.) 
However, within months after being placed on probation, Morgan violated the 
conditions of his probation by failing to complete a substance abuse evaluation or 
engage in treatment, being discharged from an aftercare program for lack of 
attendance, admittedly using methamphetamine twice in October 2009, and 
failing to report in person to his probation officer 15 out of 19 times. (R., pp.62-
63.) Before Morgan entered a denial or admission to those allegations, he was 
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charged with a new offense -- possessing methamphetamine in December 2009. 
(R., pp.155-156.) After Morgan pied guilty to the new charge and admitted the 
probation violations in his first case, he was again placed on probation. (R., 
pp.67-76, 177-182, 187-190.) Morgan failed to comply with the terms of his 
probation (discharge from in-patient drug treatment for rules violations), and the 
district court gave him the benefit of being placed on a second rider, followed by 
another period of probation. (R., pp.78-79, 88-99, 203-204, 219-224, 227-229.) 
However, Morgan again failed to comply with the conditions of probation 
by admittedly using methamphetamine, failing to notify his probation officer his 
employment had changed, failing to participate in a drug treatment program, and 
absconding from supervision. (10/15/12 Tr., p.2, L.21 - p.3, L.7; 10/29/12 Tr., 
p.20, L.24 - p.22, L.9.) At the end of the probation violation disposition hearing 
the district court stated: 
This is not the first time we've reviewed this file. We've had a 
number of probation violations, this being the third on the 2008 
case, the second on the 2009 case. 
I look at -- as I consider what would be an appropriate 
disposition, whether or not there's a possibility you could be 
compliant with probation, I really don't see that. I mean, this is --
we kind of have some repeated behavior of using and then 
absconding or not reporting and not making yourself supervisable. 
Probation's not really an option. I look at the possibility of a Rider. 
I mean, that's what your counsel is arguing. I consider that We did 
a Rider and then, following that Rider, put you back on probation 
and tried that; and that -- still had another probation violation 
following the Rider return. So I think, frankly, that option's off the 
table. 
So I am revoking probation on this. I think maybe the 
Therapeutic Community is the best bet at this point in time in a 
prison setting. So I'll recommend Therapeutic Community. But it's 
one of those situations with multiple probation violations. Problem-
14 
solving court perhaps would have been something worth trying, but 
that option's not available either. So with really not much left for me 
to utilize, I am revoking probation on this, recommend [sic] 
Therapeutic Community. 
(1/28/13 Tr., p.5, L.19 - p.6, L.19.) 
On appeal, Morgan argues that the district court should have reduced his 
underlying sentences because of the following mitigating factors: (1) he had a 
good employment record, (2) he did well during his two riders, and (3) he recently 
discovered he had mental health issues (depressive and anxiety disorders). 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.) However, none of the factors Morgan cites 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. While those factors are potentially 
mitigating, they do not suffice to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by ordering his original sentences imposed without reduction --
especially considering that the longest fixed period of Morgan's three concurrent 
sentences was three years. (See R., pp.187-190.) 
In light of Morgan's criminal history (including three prior felonies), three 
current felonies, and his repeated wasting of opportunities to comply with 
probation and the law, he has failed to demonstrate that any of his sentences are 
excessive. The district court considered all of the relevant information and 
reasonably determined Morgan was no longer a viable candidate for community 
supervision or a rider. Morgan's history and character, together with his 
demonstrated inability or unwillingness to comply with the law and the terms of 
his probation did not entitle him to reinstatement on probation, a third rider, or to 
a sua sponte reduction of his underlying sentences. Morgan has failed to 
establish that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
orders revoking Morgan's probation and executing his sentences for delivery of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) in Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 40775, and for 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in Idaho Supreme 
Court Case No. 40776. 
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2013. 
JO C. McKINNEY ! ) 
Dep
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uty Attorney GeneraY 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11 th day of December, 2013, served 
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